The Paradox of Populists in Power? Consolidation and Ineffective Governance

The UNSW Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law presents a special guest hybrid seminar by Wojciech Zomerski.

We are pleased to invite you to a guest seminar presented by Wojciech Zomerski, hosted by the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law. This hybrid event will be held in the Level 2 Boardroom at the UNSW Faculty of Law & Justice.

Join Wojciech Zomerski as he discusses his latest research project, which explores comparative cases of populism in power across the globe. This project examines two related hypotheses.

First, executive-centred systems are more vulnerable to populist capture, as such takeovers typically occur within pre-existing frameworks that already favour the executive over the legislature. Populists exploit and deepen these institutional imbalances, further weakening checks and balances – making the concentration of power both a condition and a consequence of populist rule.

Second, the project highlights a paradox of populists in power: while they concentrate power in the name of effective governance, this concentration often produces inefficiency and an incapacity to implement complex reforms – making the concentration of power not only a condition and consequence of populist rule but potentially a reason why certain populist projects lose social support and collapse.

Finally, by considering cases of democratic resilience, particularly in robust parliamentary systems such as those of Scandinavia and Australia, the study seeks to identify institutional designs that may reduce vulnerability to populist forces and inform broader debates on democratic restoration and resilience.

The seminar will be held in hybrid format, with attendees able to register in person (50 pax capacity) or online via teams. The in-person element of the seminar will be held in the Level 2 Boardroom at the UNSW Faculty of Law & Justice. For online attendees, Teams details will be forwarded to online attendees closer to the date.